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S t ev e S ch w a rze
This essay argues th a t juxtaposition is an im portant rhetorical convention fo r over
coming uncertainty and institutional inertia in relation to environm ental health haz
ards. The essay illustrates the rhetorical dynam ics o f this convention in the public
discourse that exposed the problem o f asbestos contam ination in Libby, M ontana, and
contends that the dichotomous moral fram ing o f this problem was an effective and
morally appropriate exam ple o f “ecospeak.”

ibby, M ontana, is the site of what one Environmental Protection Agency official
has called “the m ost severe hum an exposure to a hazardous material this coun
try has ever seen.”1 Over two hundred hum an deaths have been attributed to a vermiculite m ining operation that ran for m ost of the twentieth century outside of
Libby. Vermiculite was a lucrative ore for the companies that owned the mine, but
it was a death sentence for mine workers: the deposit is laced with tremolite, an
especially toxic form of asbestos that has been linked to elevated levels of asbestosis, lung cancer, and mesothelioma. At one point during the operation of the mine,
company records reported that 92 percent of the mine’s long-term workers had lung
abnormalities related to asbestos exposure.2
Miners’ families also are suffering from asbestos-related disease. For decades
workers would come home w ith clothes covered in asbestos dust, and wives and
children would breathe the toxic fibers. It is not surprising that this type of expo
sure to asbestos occurred. W. R. Grace, the company that operated the mine from
1963 until its closure in 1990, did not provide changing rooms for the workers until
the mid-1970s, and decided in 1983 that adding a shower room to their facilities
would not be cost-effective.3 A recent public health screening conducted in Libby by
the U.S. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) revealed the
extent of this exposure: fully 25 percent of those who lived with mine workers have
pleural or interstitial lung abnormalities related to asbestos exposure.4
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Beyond that, even residents who never worked at the mine or lived with those
who did are showing signs of asbestos-related disease. This is likely due to the fact
that environm ental exposure to asbestos is pervasive in Libby; ATSDR researchers
have identified 18 pathways of exposure to asbestos in the Libby area. For example,
the processing of vermiculite released dust into the air containing as m uch as five
thousand pounds of asbestos per day, and vermiculite with traces of asbestos was
used throughout the town for insulation in homes, for soil conditioner in gardens,
and for fill in schoolyards, ball fields, and skating rinks. These environmental expo
sures are the likely cause of astonishing public health statistics. The ATSDR found
that in one 20-year period the rates of m ortality from asbestosis in the Libby area
were 40 to 60 times higher than in a norm al U.S. population.5 In addition, the p u b 
lic health screening found that approximately 18 percent of all participants x-rayed
had abnormalities in the lining of their lungs, compared to pleural abnormality
rates of 0.2 to 2 percent am ong populations that do not have work-related asbestos
exposure.
These statistics docum enting the pervasiveness of asbestos-related disease leave
little doubt that Libby is the site of a serious environmental health problem.
Moreover, docum ents from W. R. Grace and state and federal agencies also leave lit
tle doubt that this problem could have been averted. Company and government
officials knew several things about asbestos hazards in Libby as early as the mid1950s but did little to eliminate those hazards:
• They knew the vermiculite deposit contained asbestos, and that asbestos dust
is toxic.6
• They knew that processing vermiculite released amounts of asbestos into the
workplace that often exceeded maximum allowable concentration levels.7
• They knew that significant percentages of workers had lung abnormalities,8
and that workers in Libby and at locations that processed Libby vermiculite
were getting sick from diseases related to asbestos exposure.9
• And they knew that if information about asbestos exposure resulting from the
processing of Libby vermiculite or the use of vermiculite products were to
become public knowledge, the company could face significant financial costs,
both from the threat of lawsuits and from declining product sales.10
In spite of this knowledge, public officials in multiple government agencies failed
to act on this knowledge, and thus failed in their duty to regulate corporate activity
and protect the health of workers and citizens.11 Early reports of the problem in
Libby highlight the role of government inaction. The newspaper article that first
brought national attention to the Libby situation, written by Andrew Schneider in
the November 18, 1999, issue of the Seattle Post-Intelligencer, encapsulates the situ
ation in this way: “The story of Libby, Mont., is the story of the m onum ental, even
unforgivable, failure of government at all levels to protect its people from corporate

E x p o s in g A

sbestos

C o n t a m i n a t io n

in

L ib b y , M

ontana

315

misdeeds that at best were neglectful and insensitive and at worst were dishonest,
im m oral and criminal.”12 Subsequent articles by Schneider draw further attention
to government failure in Libby, as does the rhetoric of citizen activists and even
some government officials. Thus, while W. R. Grace rightfully gets targeted in pu b 
lic discourse as the party responsible for this problem, government agencies also
face criticism for their acts of omission.
The story of Libby is not unlike other stories about other environmental health
struggles. Indeed, the dram atic elements of the situation in Libby—innocent vic
tims, a deceptive corporation, and an ineffective bureaucracy—resonate with other
public narratives about toxic exposure. The Love Canal story of the late 1970s, the
book and movie A Civil Action (also starring W. R. Grace) and Erin Brockovich offer
similar tales about issues of power and politics that communities confront when
trying to address toxic contam ination situations. Rhetorically, these popular n arra
tives of civic engagement w ith unresponsive government agencies and callous cor
porations provide a fram ew ork for interpreting events and m aking m oral
judgments. In particular, they provide a dram atic structure in which a rhetoric of
stark oppositions, sim plification, and m oral outrage— w hat M. Jimmie
Killingsworth and Jacqueline S. Palmer call “ecospeak”13— can be viewed as a justi
fiable response to corporate and governmental disregard for environmental health
concerns.
Such responses are precisely what led public institutions to address asbestos
problems in Libby. In this essay, I show how resident voices and investigative jo u r
nalism combined to produce a powerful public discourse that provoked institu
tional engagement w ith the environmental and health conditions in Libby. I
describe and analyze the rhetorical conventions that emerge in this discourse,
explaining how a rhetoric of exposure operates to influence meaning and action in
this environm ental health controversy. Specifically, I argue that juxtaposition is a
central rhetorical feature of this discourse that helps overcome key obstacles to
engagement with the problem. Juxtaposition contextualizes different forms of
knowledge about the situation, altering the dynamics of certainty and uncertainty
surrounding the situation; and it heightens m oral outrage, generating pressure on
public institutions to act. In m y view, the juxtapositions in the Libby rhetoric can
be judged as an effective and ethical m ode of rhetorical engagement.
To pursue these objectives, my analysis focuses on a set of texts that exposed the
asbestos problem in Libby and oriented initial public discussion. These texts include
Schneider’s series of articles in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer (hereafter referred to as PI) from mid-November 1999, which first brought national attention to the Libby sit
uation, and the transcript of a public hearing held by the M ontana Department of
Environmental Quality (DEQ) on December 1,1999, in Libby. To provide contextual
information, I have relied on other local, regional, and national newspaper accounts,
magazine articles, W. R. Grace memos, and government documents pertaining to the
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situation. I have chosen to treat Schneider’s articles and the public hearing as a rela
tively unified object of rhetorical analysis. In this situation, residents’ comments and
investigative reports share the same rhetorical purpose— exposing the existence and
consequences of asbestos contamination— and address the same audiences— the gen
eral public and institutional decision makers. Moreover, because I am interested in
conceptualizing juxtaposition as a rhetorical convention rather than in explaining the
operation of a particular text, my approach to the texts foregrounds their similarities
and downplays their differences. In this regard, my approach is akin to what James
Jasinski has called “conceptually-oriented criticism.”14
O

bstacles to

Ex p o s u r e : M

a t e r ia l

U n c e r t a in t y
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The m ain rhetorical obstacles faced by those addressing the situation in Libby are
uncertainty about material conditions and relationships and inertia on the part of
institutions responsible for investigating and addressing those conditions. These
obstacles are characteristic of environmental health controversies, and as rhetorical
scholars have noted, they present a daunting challenge for advocates trying to estab
lish relationships between environmental degradation and hum an health. For exam
ple, Killingsworth and Palmer observe how advocates such as Rachel Carson, Paul
Ehrlich, and Lois Gibbs get labeled “hysterical” on account of their provocative artic
ulations of environmental problems to hum an health issues.15 The charge of hysteria
is used to insinuate that such linkages are figments of the imagination, illusions of
certainty driven by raw emotion or sheer ideology. However, Killingsworth and
Palmer argue that from a psychoanalytic perspective, these hysterical rhetorics can be
interpreted productively as the return of repressed knowledge of environmental
degradation. As they remark, “If the fervor of environmentalism seems irrational,
that is because, in the view of the environmentalists, an ostensibly rational public dis
course has neglected the signs of trouble for so long that only a cry of pain can break
the public habit of inattention.”16 Exposing environmental health problems, then,
may dem and provocative forms of rhetoric to garner public attention and puncture
the prevailing assumption that no problems exist. Advocates face a significant rhetor
ical challenge, then, in overcoming scientific and public uncertainty about possible
material relationships between environmental degradation and hum an health.
In addition to the obstacle of material uncertainty, environmental health advo
cates often face the related obstacle of institutional inertia. For example, Phaedra
Pezzullo explores the strategies of environm ental justice advocates in Warren
County, N orth Carolina, whose rhetorical efforts prodded the state to clean up a
local toxic landfill.17 Pezzullo shows how residents “critically interrupt” the dom i
nant success-story narrative about environmental activism in W arren County and
open the possibility for a new conclusion to those narratives, one that would

E x p o s in g A

sbestos

C o n t a m i n a t io n

in

L ib b y , M

ontana

317

include environmental cleanup. In this case, advocates faced the obstacle of institu
tional inertia and invoked an earlier promise of cleanup made by the governor in
order to hold the state accountable and provoke institutional action. Similarly,
Caitlin Wills Toker examines strategies of the comic frame used by Lisa Crawford,
whose advocacy helped overcome institutional resistance to com m unity concerns
about cleanup of a form er nuclear weapons facility in Fernald, Ohio. Toker’s analy
sis shows how Crawford’s rhetoric functioned to expose the “unjust, irrational and
unfair nature”18 of institutional practices and to generate new forms of negotiation
and engagement between residents and institutional decision makers.
These studies, then, identify two key rhetorical obstacles faced by advocates
when attem pting to expose environmental health controversies: material uncer
tainty and institutional inertia. Scholars from a variety of disciplines confirm that
these obstacles are typical features of environmental contam ination situations.
Regarding uncertainty, environmental psychologist Michael R. Edelstein explains,
“Local environm ental disasters are inherently fraught with uncertainty. The pollu
tion is not easily identified nor are its characteristics easily described.”19 Sociologists
Phil Brown, Steve Kroll-Smith, and Valerie J. Gunter concur in finding an “endemic
presence of uncertain knowledge” in controversies surrounding environmental
contam ination and disease: “From the clinical literature on environments and dis
eases to the social science literature, the problem of knowing is never very far from
the center of the discussion.”20 And political scientist Sylvia Noble Tesh shows how
grassroots groups consistently enlist the support of “environmentalist” scientists to
challenge the claims of uncertainty by government and industry scientists about
environmental effects on hum an health.21
Both of these obstacles establish conditions that are ripe for rhetorical interven
tion. First, to the extent that rhetoric emerges to influence judgm ent under condi
tions of uncertainty, it can serve several im portant functions in environmental
health controversies. It can establish certainty on some issues, expose uncertainty
on others, and prom ote or thw art courses of action based on those certainties and
uncertainties. Second, rhetorical intervention can help overcome the obstacle of
institutional inertia on environmental health issues. In some instances, the obsta
cles of uncertainty and inertia are inextricably intertwined; the lack of certainty
about contam ination may result from institutional failure to investigate environ
m ental conditions or act on citizen complaints. Even when a problem is apparent,
institutions may not prioritize the problem as significant and may not consider the
problem their responsibility to address. In these instances, rhetoric can function as
a force for overcoming institutional inertia, motivating officials to take action with
regard to some problem.
The com bination of material uncertainty and institutional inertia constrains
environmental health advocates in specific, characteristic ways. Uncertainty about
material conditions can lead advocates to call on personal experience, which often
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gets discredited by public officials who prefer to base action on “the facts.”22
Similarly, an overreliance on personal experience can lead advocates to make
unw arranted generalizations, what Lawrence Buell calls “a rhetoric of unequivocal
assertion” in which citizen claims are buoyed m ore by m oral outrage than by data
and leave themselves open to charges of hysteria.23 Institutional inertia also con
strains rhetorical intervention. Victims and agency officials tend to perceive toxic
situations from very different perspectives; as Edelstein suggests, “controversy is
inherent in the relationship of toxic victims to their institutional context because
there are differences in the way citizens and technocrats view risk.”24 Due to these
competing perceptions and discourses of risk, citizens often find themselves frus
trated in their efforts to engage public institutions. In Edelstein’s view, “It is the real
ization that they cannot depend on government to solve their problems that often
spurs the contam inated com m unity’s residents to collective action aimed at forcing
a solution.”25 Indeed, citizens have found some success in overcoming these obsta
cles. As Fred Setterberg and Lonny Shavelson state, residents “have grappled with
the uncertainties of science, pressed up hard against a resistant political establish
ment, and overcome their own lack of confidence and entitlement to speak out for
commonsense solutions to complex, often immobilizing problems.”26
The Libby situation provides an exemplar of how advocates effectively addressed
material uncertainty and institutional inertia to spur investigation of ongoing envi
ronm ental and health problems. Advocates in Libby were able to reverse the dynam 
ics o f uncertain ty typical of m ost environm ental health controversies by
dem onstrating the pervasiveness of asbestos-related diseases among miners and
their families. From those grounds, advocates had a powerful basis from which they
could generate m oral outrage at W. R. Grace and government agencies for their role
in perpetuating exposure, and a compelling rationale for demanding that agencies
address ongoing environmental exposure. Juxtaposition was a prim ary rhetorical
convention in this process.
J
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The exposure of both m aterial conditions and institutional inaction forms what I
will call a rhetoric of exposure. This is a rhetoric of exposure both in form and in
content. Formally, the rhetoric functions to expose problems, and the content or
subject m atter of those problems concerns residents’ exposure to asbestos. The p u r
poses of this rhetoric are to establish certainty about past exposure and institutional
failure, generate uncertainty about ongoing exposure, and ultimately motivate
action by state institutions. Across its manifestations in specific texts, this rhetoric
relies upon the contrast between victims’ knowledge of asbestos exposure and ill
ness, and statements of officials from W. R. Grace and government officials about
the extent of their knowledge of asbestos hazards.
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The juxtaposition of these pieces of evidence is the central rhetorical convention
of the discourses that exposed the asbestos problem in Libby. By juxtaposition, I
mean the placement of apparently conflicting or contradicting pieces of evidence in
close proxim ity to one another. W ith this definition, I align my notion of juxtapo
sition w ith the strategy identified by Anne Teresa Demo and Kimberly A. Powell in
their analyses of social change rhetoric.27 Juxtaposition creates the appearance of an
incongruity between symbolic characterizations of reality, and it encourages audi
ences to take sides and make judgm ents in order to resolve the incongruity. As ear
lier research demonstrates, juxtaposition may operate in a liberatory or hegemonic
fashion;28 thus, it is im portant to continue examining instances of juxtaposition to
further understand its rhetorical functions.
In relation to Libby, juxtaposition functions effectively to recontextualize insti
tutional discourses and (in)actions, opening those discourses to questions and call
ing (in)actions into question. Residents and journalists juxtaposed institutional
knowledge claims w ith evidence of past asbestos exposure to render institutional
knowledge uncertain. Thus, as Demo illustrates in her analysis of the Guerrilla
Girls, juxtaposition “exposes . . . hypocrisies” and can function to “critique . . . insti
tutions.”29 The Libby rhetoric confirms these functions and illustrates how juxta
position can help reverse the dynamics of uncertainty that are typical of
environmental health controversies.
Further, juxtaposition functions to highlight the m oral dimension of public con
troversies. This is the case in Libby, and it is especially characteristic of the two types
of discourse I analyze here, investigative journalism and advocacy about toxicity.
Other scholars have noted that these types of discourse can hardly avoid giving
moral meaning to factual evidence. In both, m oral meanings can be generated as
the juxtaposition of evidence— words, actions, personal experience, expert testi
mony, official documents, and the like— helps to establish protagonists and antag
onists in controversies. For example, regarding discourse about toxicity, Buell has
argued that one of its chief characteristics is “the m oral passion of a battle between
David and Goliath.”30 For Buell, this m otif aligns the interests of workers and citi
zens against forces of capitalist development, using a “strategy of channeling com 
m unal hostility by linking environm ental reform w ith social justice against ‘the
com m on enemy’ of corporate greed.”31 Similarly, in investigative journalism, the
David/Goliath m otif resonates w ith the rhetorical constitution of “villainy and vic
timization” as identified by com m unication scholars James S. Ettema and Theodore
L. Glasser.32 These authors interpret investigative news stories as rhetorical con
structions that, like advocacy about toxicity, function as a powerful form of public
moral discourse. These stories rely on two im portant rhetorical features: “the inno
cence of those good citizens who have been victimized by some systemic problem,
and the guilt of those reprehensible lords of civic vice (often, though not always,
bureaucrats) who have caused the problem or else failed to address it.”33 Through
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the juxtaposition of victims and villains, stories begin to take on a m oral meaning;
events get framed “not merely as an example of a systemic problem but as a moral
outrage.”34 Thus, juxtaposition provides the formal structure for developing both
the David/Goliath and victim/villain themes, producing a moral framework for
understanding unacknowledged environmental health problems.
The juxtapositions in the Libby rhetoric present a useful case for rethinking the
m oral implications of particular rhetorical conventions. As noted above, juxtaposi
tion can be understood as an example of perspective by incongruity. In Denise M.
Bostdorff’s words, “perspective by incongruity involves altering an orientation or
expectation by viewing an incongruity, which is inconsistent or not in agreement.”35
The Libby rhetoric exemplifies this concept, as public discourse consistently
attempts to alter orientations toward institutional discourse (claims made by W. R.
Grace or government officials) by juxtaposing the latter with conflicting evidence.36
In Libby, as in other cases, perspective by incongruity foregrounds the dom inant
discourse used to characterize some situation and then views the situation from
another perspective, serving to “‘remoralize’ by accurately nam ing a situation
already demoralized by inaccuracy.”37
Juxtaposition, then, can serve a socially beneficial purpose to the extent that it
remoralizes a situation. The rhetoric that exposes the Libby situation does exactly
this. The stark oppositions and clear m oral lines drawn by the rhetoric surround
ing Libby helped to accurately nam e a situation that for decades had gone
unnam ed. Consequently, the juxtapositions illustrated here provide an example of
“ecospeak” that is productive and commendable.
J
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The rhetoric of exposure is m ost apparent in the narratives that juxtapose the state
m ents and actions of W. R. Grace and government officials against concrete exam
ples of sick miners, personal testimony from form er mine workers and their family
members, and expert testimony from doctors. Schneider’s “Uncivil Action” series in
the November 18 and 19 editions of the Seattle Post-Intelligencer provides several
examples of how journalistic narratives employ multiple forms of evidence to con
struct an article that constitutes certainty about “the facts” of the situation and
arranges those facts in a way that sum m ons m oral outrage over institutional failure.
Schneider’s introduction in the m ain P-I article of November 18 frames the sit
uation in term s of “killing” and amplifies the facts of knowledge and inaction to
generate a clear set of victims and villains:
First, it killed some miners.
Then, it killed wives and children, slipping into their homes on the dusty clothing
of hard-working men. Now the mine is closed, but in Libby, the killing goes on. The
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W. R. Grace Co. knew, from the time it bought the Zonolite vermiculite mine in 1963,
why the people in Libby were dying. But for the 30 years it owned the mine, the com
pany did not stop it.
Neither did the governments.
Not the town of Libby, not Lincoln County. Not the state of Montana, not federal
mining, health and environmental agencies, not anyone else charged with protecting
the public health.38

This introduction ends w ith the quotation in which Schneider characterizes the
story as the “m onum ental failure” of government to protect citizens from “corpo
rate misdeeds.” This broad framing of “the story of Libby” immediately identifies
the victims and villains in the story, w ith government’s role falling somewhere o u t
side of this dichotomy. That role is clarified in the November 19 article; the
November 18 article focuses prim arily on W. R. Grace.
The m oral stance of the “killing” narrative that opens the November 18 article is
supported by the juxtaposition of numerical evidence and medical testimony with
a statem ent by a W. R. Grace official. Schneider states that the paper’s investigation
has shown that at least 192 people have died from the asbestos in the mine’s vermi
culite ore, and doctors say the toll could be much higher. The doctors and Libby’s
long-suffering families say that at least another 375 people have been diagnosed with
fatal diseases caused by this silent and invisible killer. Dr. Alan Whitehouse, a lung spe
cialist from Spokane and an expert in industrial diseases, said another 12 to 15 people
from Libby are being diagnosed with the diseases—asbestosis, mesothelioma, lung
cancer—every m onth.39

Schneider juxtaposes these num bers and doctor claims with the company’s dis
course: “The W. R. Grace Co. says it did no harm . ‘Obviously we feel we m et our
obligation to our workers and to the community,’ said Jay Hughes, Grace’s senior
litigation counsel.” The juxtaposition of the weighty numerical evidence and m ed
ical testim ony with Hughes’s self-satisfied comments encourages audiences to inter
pret skeptically the claim that W. R. Grace had met its obligation. Coupled with the
initial narrative, the notion that Libby’s families have been “long-suffering” and that
their diseases were caused by a “silent and invisible killer,” this juxtaposition under
scores the innocence of victims and characterizes Grace as an unsympathetic cor
poration.
The villainy of W. R. Grace is strengthened by the story of Helen Bundrock’s
family. It is the first personal narrative we see in the article, and it functions almost
as a representative anecdote of the Libby situation. The section is entitled “A
Family’s Nightmare,” a fitting frame given the fact that “six of the family’s seven
members have been diagnosed w ith asbestos-related disease.” Schneider uses
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Helen’s words to describe her late husband A rt’s pain— from the disease and from
the knowledge that he brought home asbestos dust to his family. Then, the article
moves toward Helen’s indictm ent of W. R. Grace, in which Helen juxtaposes the
words and actions of the company w ith the effects on her son.
She said that managers at the mine told miners that the dust was harmless— a claim
echoed by other miners and denied by W. R. Grace. “They lied, but they did worse than
that,” she said, talking about when her son, now 46, went to work for Grace. “Bill had
to get a chest X-ray before they hired him. That X-ray showed he had asbestosis and
they never told him. They just let him go to work up there with all that poison. They
never told him for the 10 years he worked there.”40

Helen’s account depicts W. R. Grace as lying, which is corroborated by Schneider’s
insertion that this claim was corroborated by miners and denied by Grace.
Moreover, W. R. Grace’s villainy comes not only from lying about specific facts, but
in m aintaining that lie over time, perhaps over the stretch of multiple managers
such that Grace the company is to blame, not a particular person. Finally, this jux
taposition heightens the innocence of the victim, who did not know he was sick and
yet was knowingly exposed to “all that poison.” In this anecdote, then, the juxtapo
sition of the company’s words and actions with the ultimate effects on hum an
health work rhetorically to heighten outrage toward W. R. Grace and emphasize the
innocence of the victim.
The latter half of the article juxtaposes several types of evidence within a narra
tive to establish detailed facts about knowledge of asbestos hazards and further gen
erate m oral outrage at m ining companies and government agencies. Noting first
that the paper “examined 6,000 pages” of documents and “interviewed 110 people”
with connections to the mine, Schneider then places multiple pieces of evidence in
proxim ity to one another. He says that in 1956 the M ontana Board of Health
reported that “asbestos dust in the air is of considerable toxicity,” and that two and
a half years later, the board’s follow-up report listed four single-spaced pages of
deficiencies and repeated a warning that inhalation of asbestos dust would lead to
asbestosis. These statements from government reports are followed with the fact of
the first diagnosis of asbestosis in a Libby m iner (Glenn Taylor) in 1959, and testi
m ony from another m iner (Les Skramstad) describing work he was directed to do
at the mine involving raw asbestos. By juxtaposing this firsthand evidence from
miners w ith the state’s discourse, the narrative suggests that miners were working
with asbestos and getting sick from it even as the State of M ontana was telling the
company that their asbestos dust was a health hazard.
This juxtaposition of worker exposure to asbestos with institutional knowledge
of asbestos becomes more appalling w ith a subsequent example of what W. R. Grace
knew about asbestos and disease. First, we see the words of a 1969 internal Grace
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report that states “tremolite is definitely a health hazard.” Then, we read the state
m ent of a local doctor whose examination of x-rays found ‘“a great deal of lung
abnormalities am ong the employees . . . far in excess of what one would find in
examining the norm al population.’” This movem ent back and forth between a vari
ety of forms of evidence— government reports, m iners’ evidence, company docu
ments, medical statements— allows Schneider to generate a compelling account of
factual knowledge that W. R. Grace had about asbestos problems at the Libby mine.
The account composes a set of consistent signs of asbestos hazards, fortifying the
appearance of certainty about those hazards. Moreover, these consistent signs show
that W. R. Grace officials certainly knew of the hazards.
This constitution of certainty about asbestos hazards implies a moral judgm ent.
The overall narrative depicts several instances in which W. R. Grace knew of the
problem but neither acted to protect workers nor told workers about their own
medical condition. W. R. Grace was in the wrong because they knew of the asbestos
problems, knew of the related health problems, and failed to disclose this knowl
edge or to act upon it. Through the consistent set of juxtapositions in this story, W.
R. Grace gets framed as a villain, and m iners such as Taylor and Skramstad as
unknowing, innocent victims. This m oral judgm ent emerges implicitly from the
organization of evidence from multiple voices in the story and is supported explic
itly by an outside source, Grace’s insurance company. Schneider cites a 1969 letter
from M aryland Casualty to W. R. Grace that states, “Certainly when an X-ray pic
ture shows a change for the worse, that person m ust be told. . . . Failure to do so is
not hum ane and is in direct violation of federal law.”41 This evidence shows that it
is not merely Schneider’s personal m oral judgm ent intruding on the story, but that
others raise the issue of m oral obligation as well as legal transgression. Thus, the
rhetoric of exposure flows seamlessly from factual knowledge to m oral judgments,
offering readers a solid basis for criticism of W. R. Grace.42
Alongside the exposure of W. R. Grace, the rhetoric of the Libby situation also
criticizes government agencies that knew of problems but took little preventive or
investigative action. The government angle is at the heart of the November 19 P-I
article, and is echoed in accounts in the Missoula (Montana) Missoulian and m uch
later articles in the New York Times that focus specifically on the EPA. Schneider’s
November 19 article displays conventions similar to those of the previous day’s
story, juxtaposing comments from local, state, and federal agencies with firsthand
testimony of Libby residents who have asbestos-related health problems.
The N ovem ber 19 headline signals the basic juxtaposition at w ork in
Schneider’s article: “While people are dying, government agencies pass buck.”43
The article’s m ovem ent between the words of asbestos victims and the statements,
actions, and inactions of government agencies makes clear how hum an lives have
been damaged by the institutions that are supposed to serve them . Schneider’s
framing of the problem blunts the villainy of any specific agency, however, and
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instead indicts government as a whole. The story of Libby, again, is a story of sys
temic institutional failure to address an environm ental health problem.
The lead of the article emphasizes the buck-passing noted in the story’s headline,
playing upon a commonsense distinction between words and actions.
They all say somebody should do something.
City, county, state and federal officials agree that someone should follow up.
Inquire. Ask questions about the hundreds of people from Libby who have either died
or been diagnosed with fatal diseases after being exposed to tremolite asbestos from a
vermiculite mine.
Somebody, they say, should investigate disturbing indications that Libby may still
be at risk. But every official and every agency has a reason why, so far, they have not
been that somebody.44

This framing of the problem sets the stage for two im portant features of the rest of
the article: results of soil and air samples taken near the mine by the P-I showing
actionable levels of asbestos, and comments from an array of agency officials dis
claiming responsibility for asbestos problems. By juxtaposing these comments with
concrete evidence of potential ongoing asbestos hazards and actual ongoing health
problems, Schneider’s article constitutes a tension between material conditions and
institutional inertia that attem pts to provoke the indignation of audiences and
implies that action needs to be taken to adequately address those conditions.
This tension works rhetorically by generating uncertainty about the claims of
state institutions. In contrast to the construction of W. R. Grace’s and the govern
m ent’s certain knowledge about past asbestos hazards, the article depicts a current
situation marked by considerable uncertainty. Early in the article, Schneider states
that as the death and illness statistics grow,
(S)ome townspeople are finding questions none of the government agencies has
dared to seek answers for:
• Are the tons of asbestos debris from the m ine still killing people?
• Are people being exposed today, breathing in death sentences that will be car
ried out halfway into the next century, after decades of agonizing illness?
• Are there dangerous levels of asbestos in the air, in the ground, in the waters
of the Kootenai River?
• Are the children and grandchildren of the sick and dying, who never saw the
m ine in operation, going to die from its legacy?45

After quoting two EPA officials who reviewed the soil samples and confirmed the
need for further investigation, the article further heightens uncertainty by intro
ducing a 34-year-old logger, Shane W hitmarsh. He never worked at the mine, but
he has had pneum onia three times in one year. W hitm arsh is uncertain whether his
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illnesses are related to asbestos; through the voice of his wife, the story implies that
he is in denial about the source of his persistent illness. However, he does want cer
tainty about the safety of his children: “That old vermiculite is all over this town.
Has anyone checked to see what happened to the asbestos that’s part of it? Are our
kids safe?”46 Through this juxtaposition of asbestos evidence with a resident and his
unexplained illness, the article adds to the initial questions and bolsters the sense of
uncertainty about current asbestos exposure.
The article amplifies this uncertainty as it introduces statements from agency
officials. No agency at any level is able make claims about asbestos in Libby with any
degree of certainty, and the evasion of responsibility that echoes across the state
ments suggests that officials have not even tried to resolve uncertainties. Moving
from the local to the federal level, Schneider quotes a series of officials to illustrate
the buck-passing of the article’s headline.
First, Tony Berget, Libby’s mayor: “We know what happened in the old days, the
miners coming home covered w ith white dust. But I don’t think there’s anything to
w orry about now. If there was a problem, I’m sure the county or the state people
would have told us.”
Then, Kendra Lund, a county environmental official who claims the county has
n’t done any testing for asbestos “for years. We don’t have the facilities to test for
asbestos fibers. These are not county issues, but state issues.”
The m ining supervisor at the M ontana D epartm ent of Environmental Quality:
“We keep hearing about all these people from Libby who are sick or have died, but
no one that I know from the state has any real information.”
A state epidemiologist: “It sounds like the asbestos problem in Libby may have
fallen between the crack of ‘whose territory is it?”’
Finally, Schneider quotes John Wardell, coordinator of the EPA in Montana: “A
lot of folks are saying EPA should do this or that, but not one of them, the town, the
county or the state has w ritten us a letter or called and asked for our help. We can
not go out there unless we’re invited.”47
Through repetition, these comments amplify the uncertainty about the extent
and severity of material problems, as well as related uncertainty about institutional
responsibilities, all of which has led to overall institutional inertia.
As these com m ents are juxtaposed w ith the voices of Libby residents who have
health problems, the uncertainty of state officials takes on m oral weight. While
W hitm arsh’s pneum onia is not clearly linked to asbestos exposure, a m ore certain
case follows the com m ents from an agency official. Carrie Detrick, a 67-year-old
wom an who never worked at the m ine, has asbestosis. “‘I just got it by living
around here. It’s all over the town. . . . I can’t understand why the government
doesn’t do anything and why the newspaper doesn’t print a word. It’s like it’s a
dirty secret that nobody wants to talk about.’”48 The juxtaposition of previous
statem ents of institutional uncertainty w ith residential certainty about the
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pervasiveness of contam ination reveals a m oral problem , and Detrick herself
functions as evidence of the effects of governm ent inaction. Her comments,
which conclude the article, make the link between institutional uncertainty and
health effects in a m uch m ore pointed way. ‘“ If the governm ent says there is n o th 
ing w rong here, they’re crazy. . . . I’m going to die. Let the governm ent come to
my funeral if they need proof.’”49 The certain end that Detrick faces exposes the
m oral failure of the governm ent to protect the residents of Libby and provides a
powerful im petus for institutional action.
J
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Carrie Detrick’s comments display how juxtaposition works in the discourse of
m any Libby residents as they address asbestos exposure. Their comments in
Schneider’s articles and at the public hearing feature juxtaposition as a convention
that demarcates certainty and uncertainty about asbestos exposure. Moreover, their
advocacy in the public hearing makes explicit the implicit message of Schneider’s
articles, as residents address agency officials face-to-face and issue forceful calls for
action.
The M ontana DEQ bond reclamation hearing was held December 1, 1999, in
Memorial Gymnasium in Libby. In the fall of 1999, the DEQ issued notice that they
were going to return the rem ainder of the reclamation bond, $67,000, to the com 
pany that currently owns the mine site.50 This notice prom pted Gayla Benefield to
explore the site herself to see how well it had been reclaimed. At the hearing,
Benefield spoke about her experience, and her testimony provides a powerful exam
ple of how juxtaposition affects the rhetorical dynamics of certainty, uncertainty,
and m oral outrage.
Benefield’s testimony juxtaposes public accounts of reclamation efforts with her
own experiential knowledge to expose both material and institutional problems. She
begins her testimony by reading a 1993 article from a Libby newspaper about the
reclamation. The article describes elk and deer roaming in areas that used to have
mine tailings and heavy equipm ent on it. The article itself relies on juxtaposition as
it contrasts depictions of the old mine site with visions of pristine nature— lush
grass, green meadows, wild deer and elk—to show that reclamation can work.
Benefield’s reading of the article ends with a quotation from W. R. Grace’s local rep
resentative Alan Stringer: “‘We have proven that a mine can exist in scenic areas,’
Stringer said, ‘and that we can succeed in closing it, removing it from the face of the
earth.’”51 Grace even received an award for its reclamation efforts. However,
Benefield counters this account w ith her personal experience. “I drove up there last
fall. I was shocked. I drove up, I saw the tailings pile, I saw the pond. It did not match
everything else. It was nothing but a great big tailings pile going into the water.”52
Benefield’s personal experience was corroborated by Roger Sullivan, a Kalispell
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lawyer who has hundreds of clients in Libby and who won a case against W. R. Grace
for the wrongful death of Benefield’s mother. Sullivan’s opening presentation at the
hearing included comparison photographs of the tailings pile before and after the
operation of the mine and estimates that there were “approximately five billion
pounds of asbestos in the tailings pile that we looked at.”53 Reinforced by this evi
dence, Benefield’s juxtaposition of public accounts and personal experience provides
a powerful indictm ent of the proud claims of W. R. Grace officials.
Benefield’s initial juxtaposition exposes the m aterial dim ension of the pro b 
lem, but she goes on to expose institutional problems of uncertainty and u n re
sponsiveness:
I called the DEQ about it. I saw that a bond was being released. I called the DEQ and
they had little or no information on it. I called the EPA. There again, they had little or
no information on it at all. I asked for the DEQ report on it. I read the report. The
report was full of inconsistencies. What I read you right here is basically what the
report said. What is actually up there is entirely different.54

\
Here, Benefield places institutional uncertainty up against the certainty of her per
sonal experience at the mine site and her personal experience of a “family history
full of asbestosis.” Given her certainty about past exposure, its link to asbestosis in
her family, and her experiential knowledge about the mine site, Benefield’s com 
ments provide a solid ground for issuing a dem and that DEQ and EPA further
investigate the situation.
A more personal and stark juxtaposition comes later in the meeting from Pat
Vinion, whose father worked at the mine and who himself is diagnosed with
asbestosis. As w ith Benefield’s comments, Vinion juxtaposes the assurances of safety
with the tangible effects derived from personal experience.
When my father was a young man they told him that you can’t eat enough of that stuff.
It won’t bother you. Don’t worry about it. Well, he’s dead. When I started feeling sick
when I was younger they said, you never worked there. It’s not possible. You can’t get
it that way. You never worked there. Well, it’s more than possible. I am dying from it.55

While Vinion’s comments do not specifically identify the “they” to whom he refers,
the sharp contrast between conventional wisdom about asbestos and the material
effects of exposure further builds the case that agency officials do not have certain
knowledge about asbestos. Therefore, they need to reconsider what they know
about the relationship between asbestos and hum an health.
Environmental advocates also resisted institutional inertia. Bonnie Gestring,
spokesperson for the M ontana Environmental Inform ation Center, makes explicit
the implicit indictm ent of “the system” in Schneider’s articles. Like Benefield and
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Vinion, she questions the assurances made in official discourse by juxtaposing them
with the fact of exposure, disease, and death. Schneider reports her “angrily” deliv
ering her remarks.
I got a hand-out when I entered that says that—from the Department that says that it
is apparent that the State and Federal agencies have worked with W. R. Grace to insure
the ore processing facilities complied with statutes and standards. And I can’t under
stand how this can possibly be. How can 300 people—hundreds of people be exposed,
have asbestosis, have died from this and all the statutes and standards have been com
plied with?56

Gestring’s question makes plain the incongruity between abstract legal criteria and
concrete health effects, turning critical scrutiny toward the statutes and standards
that allowed such an environm ental health hazard to go unchecked.
In all these comments, advocates appealed to the certainty of material condi
tions, both in term s of environm ental degradation and hum an health, and juxta
posed those conditions w ith official discourses in order to expose the deficiency of
those discourses, raise uncertainty about ongoing problems, and motivate institu
tional action. Benefield’s comments expose the environmental hazards still lurking
in Libby; Vinion’s comments expose the health hazards that can result from envi
ronm ental exposure to asbestos; and Gestring’s comments expose the institutional
hazards that obscure government recognition of the environmental and health haz
ards in Libby. Taken together, these comments constitute a powerful force for over
coming the institutional inertia that advocates had faced for several years.
The comments particularly gain force by generating a sense of moral outrage
about institutional inertia. To be sure, the m oral force of residents’ rhetoric stems
from the tragic health consequences already occurring in Libby, the sense that those
problems are likely to grow over several decades, and the possibility that continued
exposure could harm children in the community.57 But it is the framing of those
elements through the convention of juxtaposition that makes their moral character
emerge and applies m oral force to state institutions. The juxtaposition of environ
m ental and health effects with statements from corporate and government actors
constitutes a sense that W. R. Grace officials have lied to residents, and that govern
m ent agencies have failed in their duties to warn and protect citizens. While the
State is not villainized to the extent that W. R. Grace is, these juxtapositions con
tribute to the perception that a m oral bond between the State and its citizens has
been violated, and that the State m ust act to reestablish that bond.
Schneider’s articles and public comments at the hearing were highly effective in
jostling state institutions into action. The EPA and ATSDR immediately sent offi
cials to Libby as a result of Schneider’s articles.58 These officials attended the public
hearing along w ith the top six officials of M ontana DEQ, several state legislators
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and state health officials, and approximately five hundred residents. Subsequently,
the federal agencies engaged in extensive environmental testing, health screenings,
and remedial action that continues today. Ongoing public advocacy by local resi
dents and persistent media coverage by Schneider and reporters for several
M ontana news outlets persuaded Governor Judy M artz to change her initial posi
tion that W. R. Grace should clean up Libby. In a surprising decision, M artz
requested in December 2001 that Libby be given expedited or “silver bullet” p rio r
ity for listing on the Superfund National Priorities List. The EPA approved removal
of Zonolite insulation (made from Libby vermiculite) from houses in Libby, a dra
matic reversal of long-standing EPA policy that asbestos products should be m an
aged “in place.” Clearly, public discourse had a significant impact on institutional
action in Libby.
J
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The preceding analysis demonstrates that the rhetoric surrounding Libby relies
heavily on juxtaposition to shed light on unacknowledged effects of asbestos expo
sure and to generate outrage that would pressure institutions to act. Consequently,
the Libby situation invites reflection on the rhetorical dynamics of juxtaposition. It
also encourages reconsideration of a central issue in the study of environmental
rhetoric: the appropriateness of the m oralizing, dichotom ous rhetoric that
Killingsworth and Palmer label “ecospeak.”
First, in the Libby rhetoric, juxtaposition recontextualizes institutional dis
courses and renders them uncertain. In both Schneider’s articles and public advo
cacy, various statements of knowledge and assurances of safety by W. R. Grace
officials and government officials are underm ined as they are juxtaposed w ith the
firsthand accounts of m iners and family members. Their experiences— of exposure,
disease, and death— provide a compelling contrast to the discourse of established
institutions. Hence, this study illustrates how rhetorical intervention can expose the
uncertainties of “official” knowledge and use that exposure as a basis for advocating
public action.59 Juxtaposition can be an effective rhetorical convention for exposing
uncertainty.
The case of Libby, then, illustrates how rhetorical intervention can reverse the
dynamics of the uncertainty that often accompanies environmental health contro
versies. In this instance, uncertainty functioned less as a negative constraint to be
overcome through public advocacy, and more as a positive opportunity that could be
used to motivate public action. The public discourse surrounding Libby reversed the
dynamics of uncertainty by shifting the burden of proof onto the State, creating the
need to provide an account as to why they failed to act in the face of clear public
health problems. Also, it created the need for public agencies to execute studies that
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would resolve their own uncertainty about conditions in Libby. In contrast to other
environmental health controversies, personal experience was not discredited, in part
because of the pervasiveness of disease but also because institutions’ prior knowledge
claims had been debunked. Thus, institutions had little ground from which they
could effectively counter the claims of residents. Instead, uncertainty at all levels of
government, juxtaposed with the certainties of disease and death in Libby, put gov
ernm ent officials in a position that demanded remedies rather than refutation.
Second, in the Libby rhetoric, juxtaposition generates outrage by creating the
appearance that a clear m oral order has been violated. The moral dimension of this
rhetoric is most apparent in the Schneider articles, where W. R. Grace is clearly
positioned as a villain in contrast to victims in Libby. Their victim status is consti
tuted by juxtaposing the knowledge that W. R. Grace and government officials had
w ith the lack of knowledge on the part of m iners and residents, and the subsequent
physical and emotional traum as they have undergone. The m oral framing carries
over into the hearing, too. Advocates pick up on the “government failure” m otif in
order to influence agency officials to redeem themselves and thereby fulfill their
m oral duty as protectors of public safety. Thus, this study confirms how public dis
course “realizes” innocence and guilt by rendering accounts of reality that are “intel
lectually comprehensible and at the same time morally meaningful.”60
The case of Libby, then, illustrates how juxtaposition can structure moral m ean
ing in a way that pressures institutions to overcome inertia and address previously
unrecognized environmental health problems. But in doing so, it forces us to con
front the crucial issue of ecospeak as a m ode of environmental rhetoric. One might
argue that the m oral meanings constructed through juxtaposition merely reinforce
the “oversimplified dichotom y” that Killingsworth and Palmer find characteristic of
ecospeak.61 Arguably, the binary constructions of David/Goliath and victim/villain
identified by Buell and by Ettema and Glasser (and found in the Libby rhetoric) are
precisely the object of Killingsworth and Palmer’s criticism. The latter claim that
environmental discourse is plagued by a tendency toward an “allegory of good guys
and bad guys, demanding of the observer a value judgm ent about the goodness or
badness of each side” and “a ready-made stock of plots and characters” that fore
close possibilities for social transform ation.62 The rhetoric exposing the situation in
Libby surely partakes of these tendencies. Moreover, while the juxtaposition of res
ident voices w ith official discourses may function as a form of critical rhetoric, it
also may reify the dichotomy between lay experience and ostensibly scientific dis
course, branding the former the product of “hysterics” and “troublemakers.”
While dichotomies have their drawbacks, I believe these drawbacks m ust be con
sidered in the context of particular situations. Exposing previously unrecognized
problems may require drawing sharp dichotomies between perpetrators and vic
tims, between abstract explanations and lived experience, between official rhetoric
and material reality. The need to avoid dichotom ous thinking may be outweighed
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by the need to gain recognition, provoke outrage, and motivate action. These needs
can only be weighed in relationship to the specific situation and the sense of advo
cates that it is time for officials to face the problem and take action.
In some cases, then, the dichotom ous m oral framing constituted through juxta
position may be a timely and appropriate gesture, a crucial catalyst for motivating
action. Libby is one of those cases. Clear identification of distinct identities and
interests, discrete categories of right and wrong, and glaring distinctions between
rhetoric and reality were needed in order to overcome the identifications, concor
dances, and unspoken consensus that prevented public recognition of the problem
in the first place.
Moreover, the particular style of ecospeak in the Libby rhetoric draws sharp divi
sions while also cultivating the crucial audience: government officials. Certainly, the
public hearing explicitly positions these officials as a prim ary audience. But the
newspaper articles, too, have government as a key audience. Robert Miraldi draws
attention to this audience in relation to the muckrakers. “W hat is true today— and
what was emerging also at the tu rn of century—is that government, more than the
public, responds especially and vigorously to journalistic exposes.”63 Ettema and
Glasser concur, arguing: “If powerful interests are to be called most fully to account,
journalists m ust draw other social institutions, especially government into a dia
logue— particularly if they are to engage in any discussion of either punishm ent or
policy reform. The initial investigative report m ust generate enough of a charge to
compel officials to respond.”64 As m entioned earlier, EPA and ATSDR officials
reported going to Libby as a direct result of Schneider’s series. The m oral outrage,
the obvious regulatory failure, and the challenge to long-standing scientific
assumptions about asbestos exposure constituted a compelling set of appeals that
moved elected representatives, agency officials, and scientists to investigate Libby.
Thus, even as the Libby rhetoric exposed the failures of government, it did so in a
way that provoked government officials to make up for those failures by aggressively
engaging the problems in Libby.
To be sure, dichotom ous m oral framings of environmental controversies can be
debilitating. But that judgm ent should be made on a case-by-case basis. Arguably,
the juxtapositions of the Libby rhetoric did not produce a debilitating case of eco
speak. Rather, they were an effective and m orally appropriate response to environ
m ental injustice.
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